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MEMO-12068

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Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

20 December 1951

Attn: []

Chief, FOM

Stay-Behind Operations

REF: MEMO-10410

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1. We are only too well aware of the fact that reference memorandum has not been answered, except insofar as it was answered in MEMO-11766, a lengthy document containing a number of suggestions concerning staybehind matters. This document was, of course, more general than specific. We will attempt to be as specific as we can in this memorandum.

2. We are in complete agreement with Para 1 of reference memorandum. There has been entirely too much tendency here to forget that, in the event of hostilities, our staybehind program could and probably would become the most important phase of our intelligence activities. It is therefore essential not only that you have the most important targets, in the order of priority, but that you also have personnel adequate for the development of an effective staybehind program.

3. We have the following suggestions with respect to the development of priority targets:

a. While it is possible for us to obtain a list of targets from LASEDAK, you are doubtless aware of the difficulties involved in such an attempt. We are willing to make the effort if you think that this is the proper approach. We should like to point out the possibility, however, that a long period of time would doubtless be required.

b. In MEMO-11766 a better suggestion was made; namely, that the field make an attempt to obtain a list of targets from RUCCM. Perhaps this attempt should be made before we make any approach here to LASEDAK.

c. There is one further possibility which appears to have some validity. ZIPPER faced much the same problem which you are facing in their inability to obtain an 'official' list of targets. ZIPPER finally solved this problem by making up their own list of priority targets according to priorities I, II and III. This list, which appears most valid to us, is available in the

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ZIPPER report dated 6 July 1951. We commend this report to your attention. Incidentally, it is interesting to note that ZIPPER listed Autobahnen, rivers, canals, railroads, etc., as top priorities. Most air fields, for example, were given a III priority rating since it was felt that air reconnaissance during hostilities would cover such targets. ZIPPER's general rule for the targets to be covered was "anything involved in movement". Put in another way, it was felt in this report that moving targets were far more important for coverage than stationary ones such as air fields. Obviously, however, a stationary target such as a rail junction would be highly important, since troop movements would be involved.

4. With reference to the personnel problem, which also haunts headquarters, we would like your ideas concerning the number of case officers needed to fill out your staybehind T/O. It is agreed without question that it is ultimately more efficient to have a certain number of case officers assigned full time to staybehind activities than to have a number of officers handling such activities on 20% of their time. So far as we know here, [] and [] are the only officers handling staybehind plans on a more or less full-time basis. Please let us know your needs.

5. Concerning para 2 (b) of reference memorandum, we currently have nothing in the way of brochures on staybehind activities except for the various official memoranda which have been sent to you. It is our understanding, however, that a regular staybehind course is now being developed by the training division. It is a distinct possibility that this course may well provide the material for a brochure in German useful for your purposes. We will follow this up.

6. We are eagerly awaiting the arrival of [] for we feel that he can help us set up a staybehind section here at headquarters and give us further details concerning problems in the field.

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29 October 1951

Chief, Foreign Division "M"

Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

Operational

Stay-Behind Operations

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1. In our general planning for stay-behind operations, we have reached the point where it becomes extremely necessary for Washington and/or COS to do some specific planning on those targets which will have to be covered by stay-behind operations. At best we can devote 20 per cent of our intelligence effort to stay-behind operations at present, and we should try to arrive at the most profitable way to apply this 20 per cent in order to be able to build the skeleton which can be expanded if and when the time should come that our entire intelligence coverage would depend on such type of operations.

2. We will require the following:

a. A basic list of targets which we would be required to cover in a war-like situation or in a situation where the territory east of the Elbe or east of the Rhein is no longer physically accessible to us. The targets should be divided into:

- (1) Locations by areas or cities,
- (2) Specific types of targets such as rail lines, air fields, dumps,

OB observations, etc.

b. That basic briefing material, if possible in German, be provided us at this time to train the stay-behind personnel in observations, report writing, and essential elements of information (I realize that a certain amount of this material has already been provided in the stay-behind memoranda which have reached us recently, but it is bulky, and it is not in German, and it would take an entire staff to break it down and to give it to specific agents).

3. The guidance requested in paragraph 2 will have to be specific, will have to limit itself to the essential elements of information, and will have to be drawn up on a strict listing of priorities since we must do the most important things now and cannot be asked to choose targets and locations from a basic paper containing dozens of each. You must, therefore, specifically tell us if you consider the Baltic ports more important than the rail crossing points across the Oder or that the rail center in Burg is more important than the one in Leipzig. I know that this request will necessitate very close liaison with the Armed Forces agencies, but it is they whom we will service at that time, and if we get their say now, they cannot complain about an inadequate coverage at a later date.

Distribution:

- 2 - FDM
- 1 - COS
- 1 - SRFG (via FOB direct)
- 1 - FOB
- 1 - BOB

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4. We have sorted out our different efforts in the stay-behind field to date and have come to the point where we will do first things first, putting emphasis at this time on recruitment of head agents and W/T operators only, except for those operations which are centered in Berlin where our particular fortunate situation permits us to recruit letter boxes, cut-outs, hiding places, reception bases, couriers, etc., without bringing the component parts of any chain together at this time.

5. The stay-behind planning causes an immense problem in man-hours and in organization which, in my estimation, if it is to be done efficiently and adequately will require a separate section within this organization, the function of which would be nothing but stay-behind operations. They should recruit organizers and recruiters who will profit by current operations undertaken by us but who would have no stake in current information operations whatsoever and will methodically go down the list of priorities and the basic stay-behind setup as we have covered it in NCB-A-10409.

6. The weight of the stay-behind work in Berlin has been borne by [] who is fully briefed on the subject and especially on the many difficulties and near impossible situations. [] is returning to the U.S. on TDY in December of this year, and I suggest that he spend his TDY in Washington helping you set up a section devoted to stay-behind planning in Washington. This does not mean, however, that you should delay the forwarding of targets and EEI's to the field until [] has returned to Washington.

7. We are perhaps at present in a better position to screen the crop of refugees and to recruit the varied personnel necessary for a stay-behind program. What we still need are case officers whose sole function would be to devote themselves to that program and detailed specific briefing and briefing material (in German if possible) which can be used by such personnel.

8. Your early reaction to this memorandum would be appreciated.

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